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NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS
Smokers pollute the air far and wide and asphyxiate every re-
spectable individual who cannot smoke in self-defense.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832)
From the turn of the century,' cigarette smokers2 have adulterated
the air3 with relative impunity.4 Traditional acceptance5 of the to-
1. Although cigarettes first appeared in the United States as early as 1854, histori-
ans generally acknowledge that the ten-fold increase in usage from 1900 to 1920 sig-
naled the beginning of the cigarette's current popularity in the United States. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR WOMEN 17 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN
1980].
Scholars have theorized that smoking had a religious origin: skyward soaring
smoke could ascend to the gods in heaven, and upon its billows carry the prayers of
the supplicant. J. GOTTSEGEN, TOBACCO-A STUDY OF ITS CONSUMPTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 107 (1940). Tobacco use did not become global until the 16th cen-
tury. Id. at 1. For an account of the early history of tobacco usage, see S. WAGNER,
CIGARETTE COUNTRY: TOBACCO IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS 3-31 (1971).
See also Note, The Non-Smoker in Public: A Review and Analysis of Non-Smokers'
Rights, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 147-51 (1974).
2. For purposes of this Recent Development, the general topic of cigarette smok-
mg shall include all types of tobacco products. For a discussion of the elemental
components common to all forms of tobacco smoke, see PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH ch. 14 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as SMOKING 19791.
3. Cigarette smoke is a highly complex gaseous solution comprised of over 3,000
separate elements. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND
WELFARE, THE SMOKING DIGEST 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST 1977]. Of
these elements, confirmed hazardous materials include carbon monoxide, nicotine,
and "tar." "Tar" is the particulate residue remaining after the elimination of nicotine
and water. See 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, reprinted in R. SHEPHARD, THE
RISKS OF PASSIVE SMOKING 18-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RISKS]. Probable
health hazards include acrolein, cresol, hydrogen cyanide, nitric oxide, nitrogen diox-
ide, and phenol. Id. Possible health hazards include acetaldehyde, acetone, acetoni-
trile, acrylonitrile, ammonia, benzene, butadione, butylamine, carbon dioxide,
crotononitrile, demethylamine, DDT, endrin, ethylamine, formaldehyde, furfural, hy-
drogen sulphide, hydroquinone, methacrolein, methyl alcohol, methylamine, nickel
compounds, and phyridine. Id. Additionally, cigarette smoke contains traces of
other toxic materials such as various heavy metals, insecticides, fungicides, fungal
products, and viruses. Id.
Cigarette smokers emit an estimated 2.25 million metric tons of gaseous and inhal-
able particulate matter into the indoor environment each year. Repace, The Problem
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bacco habit6 resulted in judicial and legislative reluctance to establish
smoking restrictions.' Increased attention to health and fitness,8
of Passive Smoking, 57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 936 (1981). For further information
on the elemental components of cigarette smoke and their effects on humans, see A.
BRODY & B. BRODY, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS 13-24 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as BRODY]; Comment, Where There's Smoke There's Ire: The Searchfor Legal
Paths to Tobacco-FreeAir, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62 (1976). For the specific constit-
uents of mainstream and sidestream smoke respectively, see RISKS, supra, at 34-36;
DIGEST 1977, supra, at 24.
4. The rights of nonsmokers have only recently established legitimacy in the
courts. See infra notes 37-117 and accompanying text. Not only have smokers tradi-
tionally enjoyed immunity from the complaints of nonsmokers, the tobacco industry
has been free from any products liability that could arise from voluntary and involun-
tary inhalation of tobacco smoke. For an excellent discussion of proposed means by
which the tobacco industry may be held liable for death, disability, and disease
caused by cigarette smoking, see Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Llability-A
Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1425-31 (1980).
5. Perhaps the best indication of public acceptance is the actual number of smok-
ers. Although the exact number of smokers is always in flux, it is generally agreed
that at least 53 million Americans are habitual smokers. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CANCER ix (1982). Cf. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1982, at 19, col. 1 (60 million); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 7, 1983, at IA,
col. 1 (56 million) [hereinafter cited as Post].
6. Dr. William Pollin, director of the National Institute for Drug Abuse, has anal-
ogized the addiction of cigarette smokers to the dependence experienced by heroin
and barbiturate users. Newmark, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
April 24, 1983, PD (Magazine), at 9-10, col. 5. A new pamphlet released by the Office
on Smoking and Health entitled "Why People Smoke Cigarettes" has labeled ciga-
rette smoking as "the most widespread example of drug dependence" in the nation.
The pamphlet specifically identifies the addictive quality of nicotine as creating the
dependence despite public knowledge of the health hazards associated with smoking.
Post, supra note 5, at IA, col. I.
Reasons for continued smoking include a sense of increased stimulation, the satis-
faction of handling items, an accentuation of pleasure and relaxation, the reduction of
negative feelings, and the infamous "craving" or psychological addiction. DIGEST
1977, supra note 3, at 5. Whatever reason is offered for perpetuating the habit, public
polls perhaps best illustrate the desire of smokers to quit. In one such poll, 66% of the
smokers surveyed stated they would like to quit smoking. Eighty-three percent indi-
cated they have tried to quit. Of these smokers who attempted to quit, approximately
29% resumed smoking after one week, and only 25% quit for six months before suc-
cumbing to the tobacco habit. Gallup Smoking Audit, 190 GALLUP REPORTS 2-3, 5
(July 1981) [hereinafter cited as GALLUP 1981].
7. For a comparison of the number of restrictive smoking bills introduced to the
actual number of laws passed, see PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, STATE LEGISLATION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH at 6-9 (1980)
[hereinafter STATE LEGISLATION 1980]; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, STATE LEGISLATION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, at
6-9 (1975). See also Repace, supra note 3, at 941.
8. A 1978 public opinion poll showed that 47% of Americans participated in a
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however, has prompted an apparent decrease in both the cigarette
consumption rate9 and public tolerance of unwelcome cigarette
smoke.'" In 1972, the Surgeon General warned the American public
of the health risks associated with passive smoking," the involuntary
physical activity. This figure is nearly twice the result (24%) obtained for the same
question in a 1961 poll. Living, 151 THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX 10 (Feb. 1978). A
recent poll indicated that health was one of the top two concerns in 81% of those
surveyed. What's Important to Americans, 198 GALLUP REPORTS 4-5 (Mar. 1982).
See generally R. CATALANO, HEALTH, BEHAVIOR AND THE COMMUNITY: AN Eco-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); K. NEWELL, HEALTH BY THE PEOPLE (1975).
9 A 1981 poll showed cigarette consumption decreased to less than one pack per
day for 38% of those surveyed, and the number of persons smoking one to two packs
per day fell to 59%. GALLUP 1981, supra note 6, at 2. Smokers of more than two
packs per day declined from 13% in 1977 to just 2% in 1981. Id.
Cigarette consumption increased from 665 cigarettes per capita in 1920 to 3,522 by
1950. In the early 1950's, the suspected link between cigarettes and cancer caused a
per capita decline. The introduction of the "filter tipped" cigarette caused consump-
tion to peak at 4,336 cigarettes per capita in 1963. The 1964 Surgeon General's report
launched a continued decline that has persisted to date. Since 1975, per capita con-
sumption has declined at an average rate of 1.4% annually. WOMEN 1980, supra note
I, at 21. See also S. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 39-44; H. DIEHL, TOBACCO AND YOUR
HEALTH: THE SMOKING CONTROVERSY 10-14 (1969).
10. See Donahue & Capshaw, The Great American Smoking Survey, AM. LUNG
Assoc BULL., Sept. 1977, at 4. The Donahue-Capshaw survey focused on whether
segregated areas should be established in public places for nonsmokers. While 78% of
the nonsmokers and 73% of the ex-smokers expressed a preference for the proposal, a
surprising 68% of the current smokers polled also replied in the affirmative. Of the
current smokers surveyed, 41% conceded that they were bothered by other smokers'
smoke. 1d.
The 1981 Gallup poll indicated the attitude of nonsmokers and smokers towards
public smoking has changed. Finding heavy pollution by cigarette smoke unaccept-
able, both groups urged a more restrictive smoking policy. GALLUP 1981, supra note
6, at 3. Of those surveyed, 46% favored a tax increase on cigarettes compared to 38%
in 1977. Forty-six percent favored a complete ban of cigarette advertisements, com-
pared to 36% in 1977. Id. Although the percentage favoring a total ban on advertis-
ing has increased, the percentage in favor of a ban on all cigarette sales has
maintained its 20% level since 1977. Id. at 3, 17.
11 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE,
SMOKING AND HEALTH 117-35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING 1972].
Passive smoking is as old as smoking itself. It occurs when one who is not presently
smoking is forced to breathe a smoker's tobacco fumes. SMOKING 1979, supra note 2,
at chs. 11-15; DIGEST 1977, supra note 3, at 23; Note, supra note 1, at 141, 144 n.29.
In this Recent Development the term "passive smoker" describes a person in the
process of involuntarily breathing smoke from another person's cigarette. The term
"nonsmoker" will be used to refer to those persons who are not presently smokers or
in the act of passive smoking.
The passive smoker suffers in various ways from the smoke emitted from a ciga-
rette. Mainstream smoke is first inhaled by the smoker through the cigarette before it
is exhaled into the air. RISKS, supra note 3, at 34. This type of smoke may be filtered
1984)
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inhalation of tobacco smoke. Bolstered by overwhelming scientific
data, 12 an active nonsmoker's movement has surfaced 13 to assert the
fundamental right to breathe smoke-free air.
Nonsmokers are actively seeking legal remedies for injuries in-
as many as three times, depending on the individual smoker. The first filter would be
contained in the cigarette itself, if a filter tip variety is selected. The second filtering
process occurs within the inside membranes of the smoker's mouth. The effectiveness
of this filtering process depends on the amount of time the smoke is actually con-
tained within the mouth before expulsion. The smoker's lungs provide the third filter.
The lungs' filtering efficiency is directly related to their general health. For specific
figures on the filtering ability of the mouth and lung, see Dalhamn, Edfors & Ry-
lander, Retention of Cigarette Smoke Components in Human Lungs, 17 ARCHIVES
ENVTL. HEALTH 746 (1968); Dalhamn, Edfors & Rylander, Mouth Absorption of Vari-
ous Compounds in Cigarette Smoke, 16 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 831 (1968).
Sidestream smoke is completely unfitered smoke emitted primarily from the burn-
ing cone of the cigarette. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTH SERVICE AND MENTAL
HEALTH AD., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 122 (1972). Since
sidestream smoke is unfiltered, this smoke constitutes a greater health hazard to the
passive smoker. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING 88-89 (1975). See also BRODY, supra note 3, at 121; Note, The Resurgence and
Validity of Anti-Smoking Legislation, 7 U.C.D. L. REV. 175, 175-76 (1974).
Although sidestream smoke comprises approximately 95% of the remaining air
contamination after the mainstream source, there are other discrete sources which
also deleteriously affect the passive smoker. See RISKS, supra note 3, at 34. Smolder
stream smoke emanates from the "butt" end of the cigarette between draws. Glow-
stream smoke is emitted from the cone of the cigarette during draws. Effusion stream
smoke escapes along the length of the cigarette paper between draws, while diffusion
stream smoke escapes through the cigarette paper between draws. Id.
12. The 1964 Surgeon General's Report is credited with first confirming the
health risks associated with smoking. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH (1964) [hereinafter cited as
SMOKING 1964]. The Surgeon General and his committee unanimously agreed that
"[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to
warrant appropriate remedial action." Id. at 33. The Surgeon General's Report fur-
ther specified the link between cigarette smoking and cancer. Id. at 31. See also S.
WAGNER, supra note 1, at 130-31.
Following the 1964 Report linking cigarette smoking to adverse health effects, sub-
sequent reports expanded upon the hazards associated with cigarette smoke. The
Surgeon General's Report of 1972 is particularly noteworthy in that the Report stated
for the first time the danger to passive smokers of inhaling smoke from a burning
cigarette. SMOKING 1972, supra note 11, at 117-35. While recognizing the need for
continued research, the 1972 report acknowledged the probable existence of a health
hazard to the passive smoker. Id. For a summarization of the 1972 report, see Stein-
feld, The Public's Responsibility" A Bill of Rightsfor the Non-Smoker, 55 R.I. MED. J.
124-25 (1972). The 1975 and 1979 reports of the Surgeon General offer additional
corroboration concerning the health hazards to the active and passive smoker alike.
See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, THE
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flicted by cigarette smokers.14 Additionally, the nonsmokers' move-
ment has encouraged the enactment of federal and state legislation
restricting smoking activities.' 5 Although legislative restrictions are
briefly discussed, this Recent Development will address principally
the present line of judicial decisions expanding the legal rights of pas-
sive smokers in the work place.
16
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL
(1975); SMOKING 1979, supra note 2, at ch. 7.
The information contained in these reports is primarily responsible for the in-
creased acknowledgment of the dangers associated with cigarette smoking. A govern-
ment poll conducted after the public had time to digest the contents of the 1964 report
showed that 80.8% of those surveyed believed there was a health hazard associated
with cigarettes. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WEL-
FARE, USE OF TOBACCO (1969). That figure rose to 81.5% in 1966. Id. By 1970, the
confirmed beliefjumped to 87.5%. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, ADULT USE OF TOBACCO (1973). A 1978 private poll revealed
90% of those surveyed believed smoking was harmful to one's health. Smoking in
America, 155 THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX 21 (June 1978).
The relationship between smoking, cardiovascular, respiratory, and cancer condi-
tions is well documented by voluminous reports. See Note, supra note 12, at 175-76.
See also BRODY, supra note 3, at 13-34. Government studies link nicotine to the onset
of heart attacks. These same studies have identified carcinogenic qualities when nico-
tine is combined with cigarette tars. Post, supra note 5, at I 1A, col. 4. A recent study
on low-nicotine cigarettes revealed that the higher risk of heart attacks is unrelated to
a reduced amount of nicotine. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 24, 1983, at 2A, col. 2.
In recognition of these scientific findings, courts have taken judicial notice of the dele-
terious quality of cigarette smoke. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
13. Active public interest groups have become effective lobbyists for legislation
restricting smoking activities. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) focuses primar-
ily on smoking issues concerning federal regulatory agencies. In a local capacity,
Group Against Smokers' Pollution (GASP) concentrates its efforts on state legislation
controlling public smoking. Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of Ciga-
rette Smoking in the United States, 5 J. OF HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., 277-86 (1980).
See also Note, supra note 1, at 151. For a state-by-state listing of organizations sup-
porting nonsmokers' rights, see BRODY, supra note 3, at 218-32.
14. Besides seeking injunctions against employers to prohibit smoke in the work
environment, nonsmokers may also bring civil lawsuits for monetary damages and
disability benefits. The availability of a tort remedy is perhaps the most effective
method of protecting the rights of passive smokers. See Note, supra note 1, at 154-58.
IS. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text. See generally A. FRITSCHLER,
SMOKING AND POLITICS: POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1969).
16. The Supreme Court has twice declined to review nonsmokers' rights cases.
Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181 (D. D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
1984]
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I. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS
A. Federal Legislation
In 1965, the federal government officially recognized the health
hazards inherent in cigarette smoking by requiring health risk warn-
ings on cigarette packages. 17 The enactment of the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act in 1970 strengthened the warning required on
cigarette packages.' In 1976, Congress promulgated legislation ban-ning cigarette advertising on television and radio.' 9 Regulations re-
stricting smoking on trains,2° buses,21 and airplanes22 became
commonplace during the 1970's as the public's attitude toward ciga-
rette smoking became less complacent.23 The federal government
now restricts smoking in federal buildings by prohibiting smoking in
elevators, auditoriums, and conference rooms lacking sufficient
ventilation.24
Controlling the sale and distribution of tobacco products consti-
tutes another method of limiting the public's exposure to cigarette
17. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (prior to the 1970 Amendment) (Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May Be Hazardous to Your Health).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982). The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970), mandated a clear warning on
cigarette packages, "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined that Cigarette
Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The 1969 Act
replaced the milder statement mandated by the original 1965 Federal Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising Act. See supra note 17.
The tobacco industry initially lobbied to halt the enactment of the federal labeling
legislation. The effort soon ceased, principally due to the realization that an adequate
warning on cigarette packages might establish an assumption of risk defense against
potential litigants. See Sapolsky, supra note 13, at 283. See generally S. WAGNER,
supra note 1, at 190-216.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). The legislation provides, in pertinent part: "After
January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium of elec-
tronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission." Id.
20. Limitation of Smoking on Interstate Passenger Carrier Vehicles, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1061 (1983). See Note, supra note 11, at 186-87.
21. The Interstate Commerce Commission limits smoking passengers to the back
30% of the seating capacity of a bus. 49 C.F.R. § 1061 (1983).
22. The Civil Aeronautics Board has restricted smoking to the back section of a
passenger aircraft. Smoking Aboard Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1983).
23. See RISKS, supra note 3, at 109.
24. 32 C.F.R. 203 (1983). See BRODY, supra note 3, at 201-03. See also RISKS,
supra note 3, at 127.
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smoke.25 Congress has been reluctant, however, to give federal regu-
latory agencies control over tobacco products. The regulation of to-
bacco products is specifically prohibited under several statutes.26
Because of federal preemptions, states may not regulate tobacco
products. Nevertheless, many state legislatures have attempted to
control passive smoking by enacting laws limiting cigarette smoking
in public places.
B. State Legislation
The Center for Disease Control has recorded state legislative activ-
ity on smoking and health since 1975.28 From 1975 to 1980, state
legislatures considered 1,788 bills pertaining to smoking and tobacco
products.2 9 Nearly one-third of the total bills introduced dealt with
limitations on smoking.3" By the end of 1980, thirty-four states31 and
the District of Columbia had passed laws limiting smoking in certain
25. Repace, supra note 3, at 941.
26. Regulation of tobacco products is specifically proscribed under the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1982); the Consumer Product
Safety Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1982); and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
§ 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1459 (1982).
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI (preemption clause).
28. See STATE LEGISLATION 1980, supra note 7, at 1.
29. See id. at 82.
Total Legislation
Base Number
Year of States* Introduced Passed
1975 48 423 60
1976 41 215 23
1977 48 392 44
1978 38 220 26
1979 48 346 39
1980 33 192 26
Total 1788 218
*Total number of states (50) less the number of states not convening and the nuinber
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areas to reduce the problem of passive smoking.3 2
Notwithstanding common features, 33 state smoking laws vary sig-
nificantly with respect to the scope of prescribed limitations34 and the
Limitation Legislation
Base Number
Year of States* Introduced Passed
1975 48 138 18
1976 41 68 4
1977 48 133 12
1978 38 56 8
1979 48 116 7
1980 33 49 1
Total 560 50
*Total number of states (50) less the number of states not convening and the number
of states not introducing smoking and health legislation.
d.
31. The states that have passed smoking restrictions are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Washington. See Note, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers:
The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REv. 444, 450 (1980).
32. Id.
33. The American Lung Association has identified four components commonly
associated with legislation restricting smoking: I) the definition of ambiguous terms
(e.g., public place); 2) a requirement that potential violators are adequately warned of
the regulations in effect; 3) clear delegation of official scope of authority; 4) designa-
tion of appropriate penalties. DIGEST 1977, supra note 3, at 83.
34. For an expanded discussion of the various state smoking acts including their
respective penalty provisions, see Note, supra note 31, at 453-58. See also STATE
LEGISLATION 1980, supra note 7, at 16-79; BRODY, supra note 3, at 154-200.
Minnesota is presently the only state to enact limitations on smoking in the work
place by guaranteeing a smoke-free environment to any employee requesting accom-
modation. At the local level, however, several cities limit smoking in the work envi-
ronment. San Francisco recently approved an ordinance, Proposition P, regulating
smoking in the office work place. The ordinance provides that employers permitting
employees to smoke in the work area must accommodate the preferences of both
nonsmoking and smoking employees. If the nonsmoking employees prefer a ban on
smoking, employers must honor the request or face fines up to $500 per day. In addi-
tion to private offices, the law applies to such work places as hospitals, libraries, medi-
cal waiting rooms, museums, and even the locker room of the San Francisco 49ers at
Candlestick Park. St. Louis Globe Democrat, Nov. 11, 1983, § D, at 4, col. 1.
In an attempt to protect "captive" employees from tobacco smoke, the town of Palo
Alto, California, recently enacted a law prohibiting the smoking of cigarettes, cigars,
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extent of enforcement.35 The lack of comprehensive no-smoking
prohibitions, coupled with limited state enforcement, has forced pas-
sive smokers to seek judicial relief.3 6
IL TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO NONSMOKERS' CLAIMS
Several legal theories have served as foundations for recovery for
and pipes in hallways, meeting rooms, restrooms, elevators, auditoriums, and class-
rooms located at the work site. Additionally, customers seeking indoor services such
as banking must extinguish smoking materials before entering lines. Violators of the
law are subject to fines up to $250. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1983, § A, at 19,
col. 4.
In the private sector, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) and the
Martin Marietta Corporation provide separate offices and cafeterias for nonsmokers
and smokers. Repace, supra note 3, at 941. The Dow Chemical Company offers fi-
nancial incentives to employees who quit smoking. Id. Merle Norman Cosmetics
prohibits smoking by employees and then gives the money saved from sick leave and
increased productivity to the employees as bonuses. Id.
35. See Comment, supra note 3, at 106. See also DIGEST 1977, supra note 3, at 84-
85. But see Note, supra note 31, at 458 (prosecution in Florida for a blatant violation
of a "no-smoking in elevator" ordinance).
36. Passive smokers have a variety of self-help options available to persuade a
smoker to abide by restrictive smoking statutes. Self-help remedies may be used with
equal vigor in jurisdictions that have no such restrictive regulations.
The "polite request" technique is advocated by the Tobacco Institute. BRODY,
supra note 3, at 127. The stereotype of complaining nonsmokers as self-righteous and
disagreeable, however, has dissuaded many from the "polite request." Irrespective of
the above concern, the recommendation remains that the irritated passive smoker
"look doleful, gasp a bit, and say, 'could I please ask you to do me the favor of putting
out your cigarette as I have bronchitis, emphysema, and a bad heart."' Id. at 126.
Although the end product of the passive smoker's gesture may well be voluntary com-
pliance, something is inherently wrong when the burden is placed upon the victim to
rely upon the sympathy of the intruder.
Adding to the difficulties associated with the "polite request" is the typical hesi-
tancy of persons to ask someone to stop doing something they obviously enjoy. Id. at
127. This hesitancy is increased when the passive smoker considers that approxi-
mately one out of every fifteen smokers becomes hostile upon a "polite request" to
not smoke. Id. For horror stories concerning indignant smokers, see id. at 127-28.
The desire to avoid creating a scene has contributed to the development of tech-
niques of persuasion. Included are dirty looks directed at the offender, opening up
windows and doors, and the use of anti-smoking buttons and bumper stickers. Id. A
particularly amusing remedy has been practiced by a nonsmoker who opens a bottle
of ammonia to overwhelm the onslaught of cigarette smoke in closed quarters. Note,
supra note 11, at 180 n.78.
Despite the willingness of most smokers to extinguish their cigarettes upon request,
the unfortunate truth is that the vast majority of passive smokers will continue to
suffer in silence rather than express their discomfort.
1984]
Washington University Open Scholarship
220 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 26:211
injury inflicted by passive smoking.37 In the landmark decision of
Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company,3" the Superior Court
of New Jersey recognized the traditional common law duty of an em-
ployer to provide a "safe and healthful" working environment.39 In
Shimp, the plaintiff, a nonsmoking employee, brought an action for
an injunction against New Jersey Bell alleging that the company's
failure to impose a ban against cigarette smoking created a health
hazard.4" The employee presented medical affidavits demonstrating
his adverse allergic reaction to cigarette smoke.4' The company had
previously installed an exhaust fan in the employee's work area;
42
however, the fan proved ineffective in alleviating the smoke-contami-
nated air.43
Acknowledging the hazards of cigarette smoke,' the Shimp court
held that the telephone company wrongfully subjected the nonsmok-
37. For a good discussion of the various legal theories that might be employed by
a passive smoker, see Note, supra note 3 1, at 461-75. See generally Note, Smokers v.
Nonsmokers: The Common Law Right to a Smoke-Free Work Environment, 48 Mo. L.
REv. 783 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Smokers v. Nonsmokers].
38. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (App. Div. 1976). For additional insight
concerning the Shimp decision as well as an analysis of the employee versus employer
smoking claim, see Note, Torts-Nonsmokers' Rights-Duty of Employer to Furnish
Safe Working Environment Will Support Injunction Against Smoking in the Work
Area, 9 Tax. TECH. L. Rv. 353 (1977); Note, Torts-Occupational Safety and
Health-Employee's Common Law Right to a Safe Workplace Compels Employer to
Eliminate Unsafe Conditions, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1074 (1977).
39. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
40. Id. at 520, 368 A.2d at 409.
41. Id. at 520-21, 368 A.2d at 410. After noting that plaintiff's allergic reaction
was verified by physician's affidavits, the court described plaintiffs symptoms upon
passive smoking as "severe throat irritation, nasal irritation sometimes taking the
form of nosebleeds, irritation to the eyes which has resulted in corneal abrasion and
corneal erosion, headaches, nausea and vomiting." Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
42. Id.
43. Id. The fan proved unsuccessful because complaints of cold drafts prevented
continuous operation. Id.
44. Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415. Taking judicial notice of the health hazards of
cigarette smoke, the Shimp court stated:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke contaminates and pol-
lutes the air, creating a health hazard not merely to the smoker but to all those
around her who must rely upon the same air supply. The right of an individual
to risk his or her own health does not include the right to jeopardize the health of
those who must remain around him or her in order to properly perform the du-




ing employee to an unsafe working environment by compelling the
employee to inhale sidestream cigarette smoke.45 The New Jersey
court distinguished natural by-products produced by the business op-
eration from unnecessary by-products. 46 Noting that cigarette smoke
was an unnecessary by-product of operating a telephone company,
the Shimp court concluded that the employee had not assumed the
risk of cigarette smoke as an occupational hazard by accepting em-
ployment.47 Recognizing the need to balance both nonsmokers' and
smokers' rights, the New Jersey court ordered the telephone company
to prohibit cigarette smoking,48 except in the cafeteria and lounge
areas.49 Thus, the Shimp court established a smoke-free working en-
vironment while still maintaining smoking areas."
Although Shimp represented a major breakthrough for non-
smokers, the question remained whether other courts would follow
the New Jersey precedent. In 1978, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia had an opportunity to address the issue
of passive smokers' rights. In Federal Employees for Non-Smokers'
45. Id. at 517, 368 A.2d at 408.
46. Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411.
47. id. The court distinguished the situation in Shimp from that presented in
Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of Am., I 1 N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (App. Div. 1951),
cert. denied, 7 N.J. 77 (1951). In Canonico, the court found the employee assumed the
risk of breathing pulverized cellulose acetate material. The court indicated that the
acetate dust was a necessary result of the operation of his employer's business. See id.
at 454-55, 78 A.2d at 416-17. In Shimp, however, only necessary office supplies were
deemed the natural by-products of plaintiff's work. 145 N.J. Super. at 523, 368 A.2d
at 411. The court concluded that cigarette smoke could not "be regarded as an occu-
pational hazard which plaintiff has voluntarily assumed in pursuing a career as a
secretary." Id.
The Shimp court further distinguished the Canonico decision by noting cellulose
dust was not inherently harmful, whereas cigarette smoke was a "nonnecessary toxic
substance." Id. at 524, 78 A.2d at 411 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411 (there is no need to fill a telephone company with
smoke in order to conduct business).
49. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416 (the nonsmoking employee has a right to a safe
working environment, but the smoking employees have the right to smoke on their
own time, during coffee breaks and lunch).
50. Id. The Shimp court also indicated that prohibiting smoking in the work area
imposed no hardship on New Jersey Bell because they already had a rule forbidding
smoking near the telephone equipment. The rationale for not allowing smoking near
the equipment was to protect the sensitive machinery. The court noted that the
human body is also very sensitive and that it is easier to replace a machine part than a
human lung. Id.
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Rights (FENSR) v. United States,5' several organizations opposed to
smoking joined with non-smoking employees of the federal govern-
ment in a suit against the United States for permitting smoking in
federal buildings. 2 Although claiming injury from accumulated to-
bacco smoke, the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of adverse
effects. The complaint alleged that by allowing smoking in federal
buildings, the federal government had violated the Occupational
Safety and Health Act,53 the first54 and the fifth 55 amendments to the
Constitution, and the common law duty of providing employees with
a safe and healthful workplace.5 6 Based on these allegations, the
plaintiffs sought an injunction restricting smoking to certain areas in
federal buildings outside work environments.5 7
The district court made two findings. First, it found that employ-
ees do not have a private right of action against federal employers
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.58 Second, the court
concluded plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action sufficient for
granting relief under the first or fifth amendments.5 9 The court re-
fused to expand its reading of the Constitution to protect nonsmokers
from inhaling tobacco smoke.6"
The court added that environmental concerns such as seeking
51. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D. D.C. 1978), afd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 926 (1979).
52. 446 F. Supp. at 182.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1982).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I (right to petition for redress of grievances).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V (denial of life, liberty and property without due pro-
cess of law).
56. 446 F. Supp. at 182.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 183-84. In reaching the conclusion that the plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action under the Constitution, the court in FENSR expressly agreed with the
analysis given in Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716
(E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
The plaintiffs in Gasper had requested a prohibition on smoking during events in the
Superdome because of adverse health effects caused by exposure to cigarette smoke.
418 F. Supp. at 717. They claimed their first, fifth and fourteenth amendment rights
were violated by allowing smoking in the arena. Id. at 718. The Gasper court re-
jected the argument, stating that "Iflor the Constitution to be read to protect non-
smokers from inhaling tobacco smoke would be to broaden the rights of the
Constitution to limits heretofore unheard of ... I" d. at 722.
60. See FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 185.
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smoke-free air are issues better suited for legislative consideration
since they affect the public interest.6 The court further noted, with-
out deciding the issue, that even if there were a common law cause of
action, the court might not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.62
Thus, the court denied relief to the federal employees.
63
In FENSR, the district court addressed only the nonsmokers' con-
stitutional and statutory claims for relief. A year later, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed nonsmokers' rights using a dif-
ferent legal theory-tort. In McCracken v. Sloan,' the court denied
relief to a postal employee for alleged assault and battery suffered
when a co-worker smoked cigars in the plaintiffs presence.65 The
court held that neither the fear of smelling tobacco smoke nor the
actual inhalation constituted an assault and battery.66 In addition,
there was no evidence that the smoke injured the plaintiff.6 7 The
court found that an apprehension of tobacco smoke is a fear one sim-
ply has to endure in a crowded world.68
In summary, after their initial victory in Shimp, nonsmokers suf-
fered a temporary setback when the courts refused to recognize a
constitutional basis for requesting restrictions on smoking in the
work environment. 69 At the same time, nonsmokers discovered that
OSHA did not cover their claims.7" In addition,; assault and battery
proved to be a meritless contention.7 For two years no new smoking
cases were adjudicated. Then, beginning in 1981, several cases were
heard involving employees who were once again asserting a right to a
smoke-free work environment.
61, Id.
62. Id. at 185-86.
63, Id. at 186.
64. 40 N.C. App. 214, 252 S.E.2d 250 (1979).
65. Id. at 215, 252 S.E.2d at 251. The fellow employee who smoked was the post-
master. The two occurrences allegedly took place in the postmaster's office when the
plaintiff came there requesting sick leave because of his allergy to tobacco smoke. Id.
66. Id. at 217, 252 S.E.2d at 252.
67. Id. The plaintiff was allergic to tobacco smoke, but there was no proof that
the two alleged incidents caused the plaintiff physical injury. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. See also Kensell v. Oklahoma,
716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also Note, Smokers v. Non-
smokers. supra note 37, at 786-89.
71. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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III. RECENT DECISIONS
In Smith v. Western Electric,72 the Missouri Court of Appeals held
that an injunction constituted the appropriate means to preclude an
employer from exposing an employee to cigarette smoke in the work
place.73 Adopting the Shimp rationale,74 the Western Electric court
relied on the established Missouri principle that an employer owes a
duty to the employee to provide a safe working environment.75
The plaintiff in Western Electric was a nonsmoking employee who
sought injunctive relief against his employer. The plaintiff alleged
the electric company breached its duty to provide a safe work place
by permitting cigarette smoking in the work area.76 Working with
fellow smoking employees in an open office, the employee began to
experience serious discomfort.77 Medical examinations revealed that
the employee suffered from a severe adverse reaction to cigarette
smoke. The employee allegedly informed Western Electric of his de-
teriorating health caused by exposure to cigarette smoke. 78 The elec-
tric company changed the employee's work area on several occasions;
however, each new work location contained significant amounts of
72. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
73. Id. at 13.
74. Not all jurisdictions have looked favorably upon the Shimp decision. In
Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983), the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia rejected the Shimp precedent and granted the defendant
employer's motion for directed verdict. Id. at 15. The Raven court, in reviewing the
District of Columbia's Air Pollution Act (D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-902 (1980)) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act laws (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-401 to 36-442
(1966)), concluded that there was neither a common-law duty nor a statute requiring
a smoke-free work environment. 462 A.2d at 14-15. As similarly expressed in
FENSR, supra notes 51-63, the Raven court also indicated that the legislature is the
appropriate body to resolve the problem of an unhealthy work environment. See 462
A.2d at 14.
75. 643 S.W.2d at 12. See Todd v. Watson, 501 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. 1973) (em-
ployer held liable for bricklayer's injuries because of failure to provide reasonably
safe working conditions at construction site); Hightower v. Edwards, 643 S.W.2d 273,
275 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (employer held liable for failing to provide reasonably safe
work place when employee was injured after falling into unprotected hopper of
fertilizer).
76. 643 S.W.2d at 11-12.
77. Plaintiffs adverse reaction included the following symptoms: "sore throat,
nausea, dizziness, headaches, blackouts, loss of memory, difficulty in concentration,
aches and pains in joints, sensitivity to noise and light, cold sweat, gagging, choking




cigarette smoke.79 Following a recommendation by the National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health, 80 Western Electric
adopted a plan to separate nonsmokers from smokers in the work
place.8 The plan, however, was never implemented.82
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's petition and remanded with instructions that injunctive re-
lief would be appropriate if the plaintiff prevailed on his claim.83
The court noted that cigarette smoke in the work area constituted a
serious health hazard to all company employees.84 Finding that
Western Electric failed to eliminate the known hazardous conditions
caused by cigarette smoke,85 the court concluded that the electric
company breached its duty to secure a safe working environment.86
The courts in both Shimp and Western Electric premised their
holdings on the common law theory of the employer's duty to pro-
vide safe working conditions.8 7 The holdings in both decisions sug-
gest cigarette smoke that is not a necessary by-product of the business
operation88 constitutes a per se unsafe working condition, thereby
subjecting the employer to liability. Contrary to the analysis in
Shimp, however, the Western Electric court failed to balance non-
smokers' interests against smokers' interests in determining whether
an injunction prohibiting smoking constituted an appropriate means
79. Id.
80. Id. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1982), established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health to develop safety standards and to implement sections 669 and 670 of the Act.
Id. § 671,
81. 643 S.W.2d at 12. Western Electric adopted a policy "protecting the rights of
both smokers and nonsmokers" by separating them into different work areas. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Western Electric court expressly recognized that an employer can be
found to have breached a duty to provide a safe workplace only if he knows the
tobacco smoke is harmful to the employee's health and he has the "authority, ability,
and reasonable means" to remedy the smoking problem in the work environment. Id.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs petition and re-
manded with instructions that injunctive relief would be appropriate if the plaintiff
prevailed on his claim. Id.
87. See supra notes 45, 85 and accompanying text.
88. 643 S.W.2d at 12. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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to provide a safe work place.89
A new theory for recovery for injuries sustained from passive
smoking emerged shortly after Western Electric. In Parodi v. Merit
Systems Protection Board and Office of Personnel Management,9" the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee's allergic reac-
tion to cigarette smoke constituted an environmental disability,91
thus entitling the employee to disability benefits.
9 2
In Parodi, the appellant, a nonsmoking employee of a federal
agency, transferred to an office occupied by several smoking co-
workers. 93 Exposed to continuous cigarette smoke, the employee be-
gan to experience serious health effects.94 Upon her doctor's recom-
mendation, the employee remained home from work. Soon
afterwards she filed for disability retirement benefits.95 Finding the
employee hypersensitive to cigarette smoke, the agency's doctors con-
cluded that her return to the same work environment would prove
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. In Western Electric, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health had recommended a balancing plan, but
it was never implemented. See supra notes 79-81.
90. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 738.
92. Id. at 740. Although the courts had never labeled a sensitivity to cigarette
smoke as an environmental limitation, prior decisions had granted unemployment
benefits to passive smokers. See, e.g., Meyer v. C.P. Clare & Co., No. 615-78 (E.D.
Idaho Nov. 17, 1978) (benefits awarded since the addition of two cigar smokers into
work area "would compel a reasonable person to leave her employment. . . ."); Ste-
vens v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, No. 6-2934 (D. Iowa Nov. 17, 1976) (benefits
granted to employee whose health required she work only in a smoke-and-dust-free
environment, even though her limitation did not preclude all possibilities of employ-
ment).
Besides granting unemployment benefits, courts have also allowed employees to
collect workmen's compensation for their smoke-related injuries. See, e.g., Brooks v.
TWA & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 257-975 (Ca. WCAB Jan. 5, 1977) (airline stew-
ardess); Braun v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., No. 37:689 (Ca. Comp. 1976) (so-
cial service worker); Stauffer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., No. 37:689 (Ca.
Comp. 1976) (bank teller).
93. 690 F.2d at 733.
94. Id. Physicians diagnosed the employee as suffering from asthmatic bronchitis
caused by an adverse allergic reaction to cigarette smoke. She experienced "continual
phlegm production, chest pains, congestion, and continued difficulty speaking and
breathing." Id. Within four minutes of exposure to cigarette smoke the employee





hazardous to her health.96 Notwithstanding these findings, the
agency determined that the employee's hypersensitive condition did
not fall within the meaning of "disabled" as provided in the Civil
Service Retirement Amendments of 1969. 97 The agency denied the
employee's claim for disability benefits98 and the employee appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the employee
had established a prima facie case for disability benefits.99 Although
acknowledging that disability entitlements traditionally concern
physical and mental limitations, the Parodi court concluded that hy-
persensitivity to cigarette smoke in the work place constituted an en-
vironmental disability."°  Finding that the federal employee
demonstrated an inability to perform work under existing conditions,
the Parodi court shifted the burden to the agency to provide employ-
ment in a safe environment.' ° The Parodi court ordered the agency
96. Id.
97. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331-8348 (1982). Prior to revision in 1980, the statute had de-
fined disability as the inability to perform "useful and efficient service in the grade or
class of position last occupied by the employee or Member because of disease or in-
jury not due to vicious habits, intemperance, or wilful misconduct on his part within
five years before becoming so disabled." Id. § 8331(b) (1982). This wording was re-
vised to read:
Any employee shall be considered to be disabled only if the employee if [sic]
found by the Office of Personnel Management to be unable, because of disease or
injury, to render useful and efficient service in the employee's position and is not
qualified for reassignment, under procedures prescribed by the Office, to a vacant
position which is in the agency at the same grade or level and in which the em-
ployee would be able to render useful and efficient service.
ld. § 8337(a) (1982). The revised definition was not used by the Parodi court since it
did not become effective until after the administrative proceedings were concluded.
690 F.2d at 737 n.8.
98. 690 F.2d at 733.
99. Id. at 738. In finding a prima facie case for disability benefits, the Parodi
court recognized the appellant's claim was unusual. Id. Most disability claims con-
cern physical or mental limitations, while the appellant's adverse reaction to cigarette
smoke constituted an environmental limitation. Id. An environmental limitation is
correctable by placing the employee in an appropriate work environment so as to
enable the employee to perform "useful and efficient service." Id. at 739.
100. Id. at 738-39. Since the express language of § 8331 of the Civil Service Re-
tirement Amendments of 1969 did not exclude consideration of environmental limita-
tions from a determination of disability, the environmental limitation qualified the
employee for disability benefits. The Parodi court further noted that no authority or
justification was cited so as to preclude benefits. Id. at 738.
101. Id. at 739. The Parodi court reasoned that the employer was in a better
position to "provide evidence of the availability of suitable employment, particularly
the availability of employment in a safe environment." Id.
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either to place the employee in a smoke-free working environment in
a position comparable in grade to her previous employment, or to
pay the employee disability retirement benefits.' 02
In the same year Parodi was decided, the district court in Washing-
ton, D.C., addressed the question of whether hypersensitivity to ciga-
rette smoke entitled an employee to relief as a handicapped person
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1°3 In Vickers v. The Veterans
Administration," the plaintiff, a nonsmoking employee for the Vet-
erans Administration Medical Center, worked in an office that per-
mitted smoking.105 On several occasions the employee requested
placement in a smoke-free working environment. 10 6 The Vickers
court held that although the employee was handicapped by the ciga-
rette smoke,"0 7 he had the burden of proving discrimination by his
employer.1 0 8 Unlike the employers in Shimp, Western Electric, and
Parodi, the Veterans Administration had taken several steps to ac-
commodate the employee's handicap. The Veterans Administration
had separated desks of nonsmokers from smokers, requested em-
ployees to refrain from smoking, installed vents to extract office
smoke, and offered to construct a partition around the employee's
desk. 09 In light of these affirmative measures taken to alleviate ciga-
rette smoke in the work area, the Vickers court concluded that the
Veterans Administration had not discriminated against the em-
102. Id. The Parodi court held that not only must a healthy work environment be
provided to the employee, but also he must be offered a position equivalent in "grade
or class." Id. The government employer was given 60 days to offer the employee
such a suitable position. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
104. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
105. Id at 87-88.
106. Id. at 88.
107. Id. at 87. The Vickers court found the employee came within the meaning of
the term "handicapped" as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) ("a physical im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities.")
549 F. Supp. at 87. Vickers suffered from hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke that per-
mitted him to work only in a smoke-free work environment. Id.
108. 549 F. Supp. at 89. Notwithstanding the finding of handicapped status, the
Vickers court could not find the discrimination necessary to provide the plaintiff with
equitable relief. Id. The Vickers court found the Veterans Administration had made
a reasonable effort to balance the interests of smoking and non-smoking employees.
Id.
109. Id. at 88.
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ployee. 110 The court, therefore, denied monetary relief for the em-
ployee's handicap."'
In another case decided in 1982, the California Court of Appeals
pursued a new line of analysis with respect to nonsmokers' rights to a
smoke-free working environment. In Hentzel v. Singer Co. ,112 a pat-
ent attorney brought an action against his former employer, claiming
that his termination was in retaliation for his protests about hazard-
ous working conditions caused by the smoking of other employees." '
In addition, the attorney sued Singer on the tort theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. He alleged the company had moved
him to an office with a greater concentration of cigarette smoke after
the attorney requested a smoke-free working environment." 4
Reviewing the attorney's retaliatory dismissal claim, the Hentzel
court determined that the company had undermined firmly estab-
lished public policy protecting employees' rights to protest working
conditions. 5 After reviewing provisions under the California Labor
Code,' 1 6 the court concluded that the discharge of the attorney for
objecting to cigarette smoke subverted the legislative purpose of the
Labor Code.' In holding that the hazardous working conditions
caused by cigarette smoke established a cause of action, the Hentzel
court joined with other courts recognizing the legal rights of passive
smokers.
Addressing the attorney's tort claim based on intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the Hentzel court held that the tort established
10. Id. at 89.
111. Id.
112. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
113. Id. at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
114. Id. at 293-95, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61. Additional problems at work that
were noted by the employee included the company's failure to segregate smoking and
non-smoking sections in conference rooms and the exclusion of appellant from meet-
ings because of his request for non-smoking sections. Id. at 294, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
115. Id. at 296, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
116. The relevant sections the Hentzel court reviewed were CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 6401-04 (Deering 1976).
117. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The Henizel court stated that
the legislative purpose underlying the California Labor Code was "achievement of
the statutory objective-a safe and healthy working environment for all employees-
requires that employees be free to call their employer's attention to such conditions,
so that the employer can be made aware of their existence, and given the opportunity
to correct them if correction is needed." Id.
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a civil action outside the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act.III
Because the Act did not provide a compensable remedy for passive
smoking, the court concluded the attorney could seek damages on an
emotional distress theory."19
The Hentzel court's recognition of the actions for retaliatory dis-
missal and intentional infliction of emotional distress is significant in
light of the absence of an allegation concerning the attorney's hyper-
sensitive condition to cigarette smoke. California thus became the
first jurisdiction to sustain the validity of a passive smoker's claim
without requiring a showing of adverse health effects caused by ciga-
rette smoke in the work environment.
IV. CONCLUSION: A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE
The landmark decision in Shimp established judicial precedent for
passive smokers seeking relief from employers who permit hazardous
smoke-filled working conditions. Since Shimp, the courts have
searched for a common law right to a safe working environment
while attempting to balance the rights of both nonsmokers and
smokers.
Moreover, recent decisions illustrate the developing recognition of
passive smokers' claims. In Western Electric, the Missouri Court of
Appeals granted relief to a nonsmoking employee who demonstrated
a direct link between the exposure to cigarette smoke and his adverse
health effects. 2 In Parodi, the Ninth Circuit held that an em-
ployee's hypersensitivity to cigarette smoke established an environ-
mental limitation entitling the employee to disability retirement
benefits.' 2 ' The extent to which an employer alleviates hazardous
working conditions caused by cigarette smoke constitutes another sig-
nificant factor considered by the courts. In Vickers, the Veterans Ad-
ministration successfully balanced a nonsmoking employee's right to
a smoke-free working environment with the smoking employees'
right to smoke. 22 In the most radical departure from the traditional
deference granted cigarette smoking, the Hentzel court recognized a
118. Id. at 304, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69. The trial court had dismissed the em-
ployee's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on grounds that the Cal-
ifornia Workers' Compensation Act served as the exclusive remedy. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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nonsmoking employee's claim for punitive damages on the grounds
of wrongful dismissal and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.'23 The decision in Hentzel arguably has opened the floodgates
for potential tort claims since a passive smoker may obtain relief
without showing specific injury.
The burgeoning reserve of case law addressing the rights of passive
smokers arises principally with respect to the employee-employer re-
lationship.' 24 Although judicial recognition of legal actions brought
by nonsmoking employees is a welcome development, the vast major-
ity of the nonsmoking populace does not have a protected right to an
environment free of tobacco smoke.' 25 The involuntary nature of
passive smoking should influence the courts to expand their hold-
ings126 to passive smokers engaged in activities outside the work
place. Only in this way can society remain certain that the right to a
smoke-free environment will endure for all.
Tammy Turner Walsh
Phillio David Wool
123. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
124. It remains puzzling as to why most employers insist on their employees hav-
ing the right to smoke, especially in light of a 1981 study by Professor William L.
Weis of Seattle University which concluded that the average cost per smoking worker
to employers is $4,611 per year. Professor Weis's figure included costs accumulated
from work absences, medical costs, increased insurance costs, worker unproductivity,
and maintenance fees. The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 11, 1983, at 10, col. 3.
See also St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 16-17, 1983, at IB, col. 4 ("[T]he American
Heart Association estimate[s] $27 billion is spent in this country each year for smok-
ing-related medical care, accidents, absenteeism and lost work output.").
125. The work area scenario constitutes approximately eight hours during the av-
erage sixteen-hour day. Smoke-filled air encountered throughout the "non-work" pe-
riod can prove every bit as annoying and equally as dangerous as that encountered at
the office.
126. In light of the recent cases dealing with the problem of smoke in the work-
place, it appears employees demonstrating adverse health effects as a direct result of
exposure to tobacco smoke have the best chance of recovering damages. The two
theories under which recovery has been granted are the common law right to a safe
workplace and a disability theory. To avoid this type of lawsuit, employers should
provide non-smoking areas for those employees requesting them. Plans developed to
deal with the controversy of smoke in the workplace should strive to establish a bal-
ance between the rights of both smokers and non-smokers.
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